Physicians' generic pharmaceutical adoption are responsible for patients, insurance payers, and their own interests. This study examines this double agency problem for physicians by using Taiwanese data, because physicians can both prescribe and dispense drugs in Tai- wan. The universal health care system in Taiwan also causes the problem to be a public concern. The empirical results show that a larger price difference between brand-name and generic drugs increases physicians' likelihood for prescribing generic prescriptions. However, for physicians in hospitals, this effect decreases as the payer's cost share percentage increases.
Introduction
An effective eye drug is available for $50. But many physicians choose a $2,000 alternative.
-The Washington Post, December 8 th , 2013
When patients enter a hospital, they seek the professional advice of physicians and treatment for their pain. Because physicians possess necessary knowledge and skills to which patients have 1 no access, patients require physicians to act as their agents. Ideally, physicians treat patients exactly as they would treat themselves. However, if physicians place their own interests above those of their patients by prescribing drugs based on financial incentives rather than on treatment effectiveness, then patients encounter a standard agency problem in which physicians behave as imperfect agents. For example, Gruber and Owing (1996) identified an increase number of cesarean deliveries in a state is related with a within-state fertility declines in the United States, arguing that the decisions of physicians to utilise C-sections were influenced by financial incentives. Liu et al. (2009) and Iizuka (2012) have found that physicians' financial incentives are critical determinants of their prescription decisions.
1 Other professions in which the knowledge gap between experts and consumers is substantial exhibit the same problem.
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In the health care industry, it is common that part or all of patients' costs are paid by a third-party insurance payer. The physician agency problem is thus complex because physicians act not only as agents for patients but also their insurance payers (Blomqvist, 1991; Lundin, 2000) . The payers prefer physicians to minimize the treatment cost, whereas patients prefer physicians to provide the most effective, but sometimes more expensive, treatments that they offer. For example, Meier and Thomas of The New York Times (2012) reported that, in the United States, insurers pay substantially high markups when physicians dispense drugs in their offices.
3 Physicians argue that this practice is best for patients because it saves their time, but the resulting cost is borne by the payer, not the patient or physician. Whoriskey and Keating of the The Washington Post (2013) reported that physicians profit from more-costly treatment when the alternative is equally effective. This costs Medicare a billion or more of extra payment annually. Pauly (1968) and Hellerstein (1998) have identified this problem to be a moral hazard problem, in which either the amount or the price of the health care demanded is greater than the socially optimal level. Along with the agency problem between physicians and patients when prescribing medications, physicians act as a double agent who must consider the interests of patients and payers, as well as their own interests. This study examines this double agency problem by using data from Taiwan. These data provide a unique opportunity for studying the problem because of two institution features of the health care system in Taiwan: First, Taiwan is one of the few countries worldwide that has adopted a universal health care system. Under this system, the government is the single payer that finances health expenditure through public revenue. Therefore, the moral hazard problem created by physicians is a public issue. Patients do not necessarily benefit from physicians' favorable treatment, because they must pay the cost eventually. Second, physicians in Taiwan both prescribe and dispense drugs. This provides a strong incentive for them to place their financial interests above patients' and the payer's demands when prescribing drugs. Consequently, this study focuses on the determinants of physicians' medication prescriptions in Taiwan, especially physicians' adoption of generic drugs. As mentioned in Iizuka (2012) , pharmaceutical expenditure constitutes a substantial proportion of the total medical expenditure. Governments worldwide promote the use of generic drugs to reduce this expenditure, but the adoption rate is still lower than 20% in some countries. In addition, Hsieh (2009) mentioned that pharmaceuticals account for more than one-fourth of the health expenditure in Taiwan, and the market share of outpatient generic drugs is less than 50%. Therefore, the double agency problem of physicians in Taiwan is a public issue involving a great amount of expenditure because of these two institutional features of the health care industry. This paper differs from the previous literature in two aspects. First, this is the first empirical study of the double agency problem for physicians using an integrated empirical framework, in which both physicians' moral hazard problem regarding the insurance payer and agency problem regarding the patient are considered. Hellerstein (1998) , Lundin (2000) , and O' Malley et al. (2006) have studied the moral hazard problem for physicians, and only Hellerstein (1998) observed no evidence of moral hazard. In addition, Iizuka (2007 Iizuka ( , 2012 and Liu et al. (2009) have studied the agency problem for physicians by using Japanese and Taiwanese data, respectively. Because both countries allow physicians to prescribe and dispense drugs, these papers provide strong evidence suggesting that physicians respond to financial incentives when prescribing medications. Second, the Taiwanese data on diabetic patients used in this study were structured using the panel framework suggested by Iizuka (2012) . This framework allowed the current study to apply the correlated random effect approach suggested by Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1980) to control the effect of physicians' unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity on their prescription behavior, which has been identified as a critical determinant by Coscelli (2000) , Lundin (2000) , and Iizuka (2012) . Using this method also prevented endogeneity in the regression from becoming a concern.
This study begins with an empirical model of physicians' prescription behavior that includes both the patients' and physicians' utilities. Because a substantial proportion of patients' medical expenditure is covered by the government, this share of the cost is also internalized into the physicians' decision problem. To empirically estimate this model, randomness is introduced for both patients' and physicians' utility. Empirical results were obtained after controlling the physicians', patients', and hospitals' characteristics; time-, location-, and drug-fixed effects, and the physicians' unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity. The results show that physicians internalized patients' utility, because a larger price difference between brand-name and generic drugs increased physicians' probability of generic medications. However, this effect decreased as the payer's cost share percentage increased. The results observed when using samples of clinics and hospitals further show that this effect is produced mainly by physicians in hospitals. These results indicate that physicians' moral hazard problem for the payer is prevalent among the physicians in hospitals, because their medication decisions are sensitive to whom pays the drug cost.
Regarding the effect of the financial incentives of physicians on their adoption of generic pharmaceuticals, this study shows that the owners of hospitals and clinics prescribed more generic drugs than employed physicians. Because owners have more discretions in drug formulary decision and control most of the profit earned from their prescriptions, the results indicate that owners behaved differently from their employees. Similarly, other profit-sensitive physicians, such as physicians in clinics or private institutions, were found to prescribe more generic drugs than physicians in other accreditation levels of hospitals and public institutions, respectively. In addition, the empirical results show that physicians' prescription of generic medications decreased as the number of competitors in the same ingredient market decreased, and the effect was particularly strong for hospital owners. Because market competition causes the drug price to decrease, but leaves the marginal cost unaffected, the profits and rents earned from generic drug sales are thus reduced. This affects the amount of resource spent on marketing these drugs to physicians. This result provides another evidence showing that physicians' decisions of generic adoptions are substantially affected by their financial incentives.
The following section introduces the empirical framework used for estimation. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes this paper. The Appendix provides details on the data and information on the drugs analyzed in this paper.
Empirical Framework
In this section, the model of physicians' prescription behavior proposed by Hellerstein's (1998) is modified to include physicians' financial incentives, which have been discussed by Liu et al. (2009) and Iizuka (2012) .
The Physicians' Double Agency Problem
Consider physician j who prescribes either a generic (G = 1) or a brand name (G = 0) version of the same oral hypoglycemic agent (OHA) for patient i. Define U j = U j (u i , π j ) as physician j's utility gained from prescribing an OHA to patient i, which is a function of patient i's utility u i and physician j's financial incentives, π j . Assume the utility function is linear as follows:
where z={0,1} and γ 1 , γ 2 ∈ [0,1], which represent the weights given by the physician to the patient's utility and his financial incentives, respectively. When the physician considers only about his financial incentives, it is expected that γ 1 = 0 and γ 2 = 1. By contrast, γ 1 = 1 and γ 2 = 0 when the physician fully internalizes the patient's utility and does not consider his financial incentives.
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The patient's utility gained from this prescription consists of the price (P k ) and quality (q k ) of drug k, where u ik (G = z) = −P zk + ζq zk . The term ζ is a monetary transformation that enables the patient's utility obtained from the drug's quality to be comparable with the utility gained from payment. Thus, the difference between the patient's utility gained from being prescribed a generic version of the drug rather than a brand-name version is
where ∆P k = P 0k − P 1k and ∆q k = q 0k − q 1k .
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The physician's financial incentives are assumed to be π jzk = α j ξ jzk , where ξ jzk represents the profit that physician j receives from prescribing the z version of drug k, 6 and α j ∈ [0,1] indicates physician j's authority to this profit. For example, owners of hospitals and clinics, and physicians in clinics or small hospitals, have more discretions in deciding drug formulary and are entitled to greater proportion of the profits earned from a prescription than the other physicians. Therefore, α j accounts for this difference. The physician's difference in utility between prescribing a generic version and a brand-name version of drug k for a patient can thus be expressed as follows:
where α j ∆ξ jk = α j (π j1k −π j0k ) indicates the difference of physician's profits earned from prescribing a generic and a brand-name drug. A physician prescribes a generic version of drug k if ∆U jk > 0, and vice versa.
4 Note that γ 1 +γ 2 is not restricted or normalized to be 1, because another weight is to be introduced. 5 ∆P k is assumed nonnegative because the price of a brand-name drug is greater than that of its generic version. Consequently, patient i's utility from generic prescriptions increases as the price difference between brand-name and generic drugs increases. Besides, the sign of ∆q k is left unspecified because the quality difference between brand-name and generic drugs may vary with drugs. We are grateful for comments from several physicians on this point. Also, ∆q k can be interpreted as perceived quality for patients. For example, most patients in Taiwan believe that brand-name drugs are better than their generic alternatives. Given this preference, patient i's utility from generic prescriptions decreases as the quality difference between brand-name and generic drugs increases.
6 For example, consider ξ jzk =P zk − P T zk , where P zk is the reimbursement price of drug k paid by the NHI to hospitals, and P T zk is the real cost paid by hospitals to pharmaceutical producers. Because P T zk was not observed in the data, ξ jzk account for this profit. ξ jzk also proxies for other financial incentives for physicians that are not revealed in the data, such as gifts or donations from pharmaceutical firms to hospitals.
A substantial portion of patients' health expenditure on diabetic drugs is covered by national health insurance (NHI) in Taiwan. The inclusion of this institutional feature distinguishes this paper from those of Liu et al. (2009) and Iizuka (2012) , who have focused on the effect of physicians' financial incentives on their prescription behavior, α j ∆ξ jk . This model includes this institutional feature as follows:
where θ is the proportion of the drug cost covered by NHI, and γ 3 ∈ [0,1] is the weight that a physician gives to this cost. A low value of γ 3 indicates that the physician does not effectively account for the government's spending on covering patients' drug expenditures when prescribing drugs. Eq. (4) can be rearranged as follows:
Eq. (5) shows the probability for physician j to prescribe a generic drug k as an increasing function of (γ 3 − γ 1 ). If γ 3 <γ 1 , then the physician is likely to prescribe the brand-name version of drug k because the cost is not fully borne by the patient. Hellerstein (1998) defined this case as a "moral hazard in insurance." In a country with a universal health care system, this case may be prevalent because almost every patient is covered by the government. By contrast, Eq. (5) returns to Eq. (3) when γ 3 =γ 1 , which represents the case in which the physician is indifferent to who is paying for the drug. This problem can also be formulated according to the marginal effect of the difference in drug price on the physician's utility difference from prescribing a generic medication as follows:
As shown in the equation above, θ provides a source of identification of the physician's moral hazard problem to the payer, γ 3 . As the price difference between a drug's brand-name and generic version increases, Eq. (6) measures the degree to which the extra cost shared between the patient and the payer affects the physician's decision. For example, if γ 1 > 0 but γ 3 − γ 1 < 0, then the physician considers patient's utility by prescribing more generic drugs as the price difference increases; however, this concern diminishes if more costs are paid by the payer. This model thus accounts for a physician's double agency problem by decomposing the physician's utility gained from prescribing a generic medication based on the patient (γ 1 ), the insurance payer (γ 3 ), and his own financial incentives (γ 2 ).
Empirical Implementation
To empirically examine the proposed model, randomness is introduced into the deterministic physician's prescription decision function, Eq. (5). Specifically, patients are allowed to be heterogeneous in their utilities by introducing R ik into the utility function Eq. (2), where ∆u ik = ∆P k −ζ∆q k +R ik . The term R ik includes patients' observable characteristics such as sex, age, and the severity of the diabetes (X i ), as well as unobservable characteristics such as individual preference for drug k (ε ik ). Because the quality difference between the generic and brand-name versions of drug k, ∆q k , was unavailable in the data, this effect was controlled by applying a vector of drug class dummies according to its ingredients, Q k , as suggested by Hellerstein (1998) . Some of this drug quality difference that is not captured by Q k is captured by ε ik . The patient's utility difference then becomes
Similarly, physicians are allowed to be heterogeneous in their financial incentives by introducing R jk into their utility function for prescribing drug k, ∆π jk = α j ∆ξ jk + R jk , where R jk = β j X j + ε jk . The term X j controls the physician's observable characteristics such as age and experience. Hellerstein (1998) argues that some physicians may prescribe certain drugs constantly because of the costs involved in acquiring information on new drugs. This potential effect was controlled by using a physician's experience and the accreditation level of his hospital (H j ) as empirical proxies, because the cost of information acquisition is related to a physician's experience and his work place. The term ε jk represents unobservable determinants of the physician's prescription decisions, such as his preference for drug k; ε jk also controls the proportion of α j ∆ξ jk that is not captured by the other empirical proxies.
This study applies three empirical proxies to estimate the physician's financial incentives α j ∆ξ jk : O j , H j , and F k . First, O j is mainly an empirical proxy for α j in Eq. (3), which indicates whether a physician owns a clinic or hospital. Because owners of hospitals control most of their profit allocation and have a greater power in deciding the drug formulary of their hospitals than the employed physicians, α j is positively related with O j . The owners are also more responsive to the profits earned by their clinics and hospitals than the employees, because the employees' salary might not related to the drugs prescribed.
Second, another proxy for α j ∆ξ jk is H j , which measures the size of a hospital where a physician works. Because the number of physicians in clinics is lower than that in hospitals, physicians in clinics may be more responsive to profits earned than physicians in hospitals. In addition, in some large hospitals in Taiwan, executive committees rather than individual physicians decide which drugs to purchase. Physicians' choices of prescriptions are thus limited by the drugs available within the affiliated hospitals, and their decisions are likely to reflect the hospital committees' collective preferences rather than their own preferences.
7 Although the above discussion stressed the correlations between H j and α j , H j is also a proxy for ∆ξ jk . For example, Liu et al. (2009) argued that larger hospitals have more market power in both the brand-name and generic drug markets. The inclusion of H j thus controls these potential behavioral differences among physicians in clinics and hospitals.
8 Similarly, whether a hospital is public owned is another empirical proxy similar to H j , because private hospitals are more responsive to profits earned than public hospitals. Third, F k measures the number of pharmaceutical firms competing in the market of a given ingredient disregarding the dosage. Although Liu et al. (2009) considered drugs packed with different dosages as different products, this paper applies the current measure because a pharmaceutical company may produce products with the same ingredient but different packages as a means to increase their market share. Because the sales revenue from these products is received by the same producer, these are not competing products. The pharmaceutical company also probably promotes these drugs by using the same marketing strategy, which affects physicians' behavior similarly.
This study applies F k as an empirical proxy of ∆ξ jk . According to Liu et al. (2012) , the reimbursement price set by the NHI for brand-name drugs is considerably higher than that for generic drugs. They also observed that the price of generic drugs is more responsive to the competition than that of brand-name drugs, and substantially decreases as the number of generic competitors increases. Consequently, an increase in competitions in a market may reduce generic drug producers' profits by driving down the reimbursement price for generic drugs further from the reimbursement price of brand-name drugs. Using data from the generic drug industry in the U.S., Reiffen and Ward (2005) showed that generic drug producers' rents and price decrease as the number of competitors increases. Therefore, an increase of market competitions reduces the proportion of generic drug producers' profits that can be used in marketing their products, and reduces physicians' incentive to prescribe their generic drugs. By contrast, Liu et al. (2009) hypothesized that, when market competition increases, generic firms provide a higher discount rate for physicians than their brand-name counterparts do, because their marginal cost is lower. However, because the reimbursement price of a drug decreases as the number of competitors increases, and the marginal cost is unaffected, the generic firms' profits that can be applied to promote their drugs decreases faster than that of the brand-name firms.
The empirical equation of the physician's financial incentives thus becomes
Because α j ∆ξ k emphasizes physicians' responses to financial incentives depend on their authority on the hospital formulary, the interaction terms in Eq. (8) capture this effect. For example, β OF shows whether an owner of a hospital is affected by the drug market competition differently from other employed physicians, and β OH measures how the owners' prescription decisions vary according to hospital level. The empirical counterpart of Eq. (5) can therefore be summarized as follows:
Because only the physician's choice, not utility, is observed, Eq. (9) is rewritten as a latent variable model with a time subscript as follows:
where G ijkt = 1 indicates that physician j prescribes a generic version of drug k for patient i in the t th prescription, which occurs when the physician's utility gained from prescribing a generic version of drug k is greater than that gained from prescribing a brand-name version. If ε ikt and ε jkt are assumed to be independent with a normal distribution, then simple probit can be applied to estimate Eq. (10) (Liu et al., 2009 ). However, this method involves the assumption that no correlation exists among patients of a given physician, which might bias this probit estimate if the correlation exists (Hellerstein, 1998) . For example, consider an unobserved, time-invariant, physician-specific preference to a brand-name version of drug k, c jk , which influences the physician's utility such that ε jkt = c jk + v jkt . If most patients of this physician are older and have severe diabetes, then both the physician and patients may prefer the brand-name version because of its perceived quality. Consequently, the patients' preference ε ikt is related to physician's preference c jk . Hellerstein (1998) explained c jk as the physician's adjustment cost required to prescribe the generic version of drug k, because a physician who is unfamiliar with the generic drug must spend effort to access information on this alternative. 10 drugs, which then reduce physician's financial incentives of prescribing generic drugs. By contrast, Liu et al. (2009) assumed that, as market competition increases, P T 1k decreases thus P T 0k -P T 1k increases. 10 Other than patients' age and severity of their disease, Bronnenberg et al. (2013) also showed that consumers' educational background and occupation are related to their preference for branded headache remedies.
9
To address the endogenous problem mentioned previously, Chamberlain's correlated random effects probit model introduced by Wooldridge (2010, pp. 616 ) was applied in this study. This model enables the unobserable fixed effects of physician, c jk , to be correlated with some of the patients' characteristics as follows:
where X i is an average of X it , t = 1, ..., T ; L j are indicator variables that control the fixed effects of the hospital's location, which are related to some of the patients' characteristics; σ 2 a is the variance from the equation c jk = ψ + ξX i + β L L j + a jk ; and X i controls the possible correlations between patients' unobservable characteristics and the physician's preference of the generic version of drug k, which enables the traditional random effect estimates to be consistent.
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Similar to Iizuka (2012) , this study structures the data into a panel framework by using visitphysician-drug as a unit of observation (i-j-k in the proposed model). Each physician is treated as a group, and his number of medication orders is applied as the time dimension t. The repeated observations of a physician's prescription behavior replace the usual dimension of time, which allows the possibility to control unobserved, within-group variations that may affect the physician's prescription behaviors as previously mentioned. This study thus excluded physicians with fewer than four observations in the sample, which was approximately 7.62% of the original 88,706 observations. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to structure the Taiwan's National Health Insurance Research Database (NHIRD) into this panel framework.
Data
The proposed empirical framework was estimated by using the medical claims data from the NHIRD. In March 1995, Taiwan launched a single-payer health insurance program that provides insurance coverage to every resident in Taiwan.
12 The National Health Insurance Administration (NHIA) contracted over 90% of the hospitals in Taiwan as the medical service providers (Kan et al., 2011) , and the medical claims those hospitals filed for reimbursement from the NHI constitute the NHIRD. Each claims is a record of the information of a single treatment; and several claim records might be recorded for one visit, because a patient might receive multiple treatments in one visit. Each claims consists of time and place of the treatment, the code of the disease, and the physician's treatments, such as examinations and medications, and the associated expenditure information related to the treatment, including the service fee of the physician and the medication service fee. Patient information such as sex, age, and deductibles are also recorded in each claim. Details on how the sample was assembled for the empirical analysis are explained in the Appendix. This study uses sampling data from the NHIRD, from which 0.2% of the data were extracted using a systematic sampling method on a monthly basis. 13 This study uses a sample from 2003 because detailed drug information was recorded only after 2003. Using this sample period also minimizes the concern that physicians' prescription behavior differed before and after the global budget system was implemented in 2002.
14 Based on the suggestion of Liu et al. (2009) , the empirical framework was estimated by using patients with diabetes. There are three advantages to focusing on this chronic disease: First, it accounts for a substantial amount of Taiwan's health care expenditure; second, the market for the main therapeutic class of prescription drugs for diabetes, OHAs, is highly competitive in Taiwan; third, the therapeutic class of OHAs exhibits sufficient variations between brand-name and generic drugs. The Appendix provides additional details on the drugs used in this study and the sources of the corresponding data. Only drugs with both brand-name and generic prescriptions were included in the sample, and drugs with no generic version or for which the generic version was not prescribed during a year were excluded. Consequently, ten OHAs were included in the sample, and some of the drugs were included only in parts of the sampling period.
15 Table 1 provides summarized information on the OHAs. First, the average price per defined daily dose (DDD) 16 was approximately NT$10, which was calculated using Eq. (6) in Liu et at.
(2009). Specifically, this value was obtained by using the reimbursement price of a drug set by the NHIA divided by the dosage unit per package of that drug, and multiplied by the DDD of the drug. Second, the price difference between brand-name and generic versions of drugs with the same ingredient, ∆P , was calculated as the difference between the prices of the brand-name drug and the drug prescribed by a physician. If a brand-name drug was prescribed, then ∆P =0. Table  1 shows that the average of this difference was approximately NT$6, which is 60% of the average price. Third, Table 1 shows that NHI covered nearly 89% of the cost of each treatment, which was calculated by dividing the total amount paid to the applicant hospital by the total cost per 13 In particular, the data include the ambulatory care expenditures by visit (CD) and the corresponding records of ambulatory care orders (OO). The Appendix provides additional details on the data.
14 The global budget system was implemented gradually in various health care sectors in Taiwan, started from dentists in 1998. In 2002, hospitals were the last sector to be included in this system. For more details about this system, See Kan et al. (2011) . Table 2 lists these drugs as 0% under Percentage Generics column in certain sample years.
16 Daily dose of each OHA is defined by the WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics and can be found at http://www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_index. The defined daily doses is important here because drug price were defined as the price required for defined daily doses of a drug, which makes the price comparable among various drugs. treatment order. Finally, approximately 68% of the observations were generic prescriptions. Drugs with the same ingredient had on average of 34 competitors in their respective markets.
Physicians' characteristics in the sample were also summarized in Table 1 . Because the data were sampled from the NHIRD according to hospital claims, neither the complete medical histories of the patients nor the physicians' complete medical records were observed.
17 Table 1 shows that sufficient variations existed within (approximately 36 prescriptions and 35 visits per physician on average) and between these physicians (4,834 physicians). The physicians had an average of 6.7 years of experience, and 29% of them owned their hospital or clinic. In addition, 33.8% of the physicians prescribed only generic drugs (1,634 physicians), and less than three percent of the physicians prescribed only brand-name drugs (128 physicians) in the sample. Figure 1 shows the percentage of physicians according to their generic prescription rates, where physicians with one hundred percent generic prescription rates were excluded to improve the readability of the figure. This figure presents the variation that this study seeks to explain, and was sufficiently large among physicians.
In addition to physicians' information, each medical claim observation in the NHIRD includes information on the patient's sex and age, for which summary statistics are reported in Table 1 . Based on Liu et al. (2009) , a disease severity index was calculated that ranges from 1 to 3, indicating the number of OHA products a patient received. Moreover, if an insulin injection was prescribed during a single visit, then the patient's severity was ranked as 3. Besides, hospital's information was obtained from the registry data in the NHIRD. The hospitals were open for an average of 8 years. Approximately one-fourth of the hospitals were publicly owned. Hospitals are classified into the following three accreditation levels according to their size from large to small: academic medical centers (H 1 ), metropolitan hospitals (H 2 ), and local community hospitals (H 3 ). As shown in Table 1 , nearly one-third of the sample were prescriptions from clinics. Table 1 also indicates that more than 40% of the hospitals and clinics were located in Northern Taiwan (including the Taipei Branch), and less than 3% of the hospitals and clinics were located in Eastern Taiwan.
Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results applying the proposed empirical framework to the sample from the NHIRD. To distinguish the effect of controlling the unobserved, time-invariant effect c jk , the estimates from the pooled probit and correlated random effect probit models are both presented. The marginal effects are also presented along with the original estimates. Table 2 shows the results observed using the entire sample. Estimates with and without controlling random effects were similar in signs and statistical significance, but different in magnitudes. Random effects proxies were significant both separately and jointly (χ 2 =29.88), indicating that physicians with patients that are mostly old or female or have severer diabetes were more likely to prescribe brand-name drugs. The results show that the unobserved, time-invariant individual heterogeneity of physicians is crucial determinant in their prescription decisions. Table 2 also shows that more experienced physicians and physicians in long-established hospitals were more likely to prescribe generic drugs. As discussed in Section 2, these physicians were probably more informed about the available generic drugs, because their cost of accessing this information is lower than that of new physicians. 18 More experienced physicians were also likely to have a greater impact on the decisions of drug formulary of their hospitals than that of new physicians. Table 2 also shows that, the greater the price difference ∆P , the more likely physicians were to prescribe generic drugs. This indicates a positive γ 1 in Eq. (5), which shows that physicians had internalized patients' utilities when prescribing drugs. However, this effect decreased as the payer's cost sharing proportion increased as revealed by a negative estimate of γ 3 -γ 1 in Eq. (5). In particular, the estimates of ∆P and θ∆P in Column 4 show that the probability that generic drugs were prescribed increased by 6% when the brand-name drug is NT$ 1 more expensive than the generic drug; however, this effect decreased by .6% percent of the payer's share of the cost. In other words, if the payer shares 10% or more of this drug cost, it became more likely for physicians to prescribe brand-name drugs as ∆P increased. These estimates indicate that physicians placed more weight on the patients' utility (γ 1 ) than on the payer's extra cost (γ 3 ). Because the average cost sharing percentage in the sample was nearly 89%, the results imply that an average physician's probability to prescribe a brand-name drug increased as the price difference ∆P increased, probably because the cost was not fully borne by the patient.
Regarding the effect of physicians' financial incentives on their decisions to prescribe generic drugs, Column 4 of Table 2 indicates that hospital owners prescribed approximately 24% more generic drugs than other physicians. This estimate indicates that owners favored generic drugs more than the brand-name drugs. Column 4 of Table 2 also shows that one additional competitor in the same ingredient market (F ) reduced the physicians' probability to prescribe generic drugs by approximately 5%, indicating that more intense competition in the market reduces physicians' incentives to prescribe generic drugs. This effect is stronger for hospital owners than for other physicians, because an additional competitor reduces the probability to prescribe generic drugs of hospital owners more than it reduces that of other physicians by approximately 5.9%. These estimates were similar and statistically significant regardless of the inclusion of random effects. The results support the hypothesis that physicians' probability to prescribe generic drugs decreases as the market competition on those drugs increases.
Another proxy for physicians' financial incentives was the hospital accreditation level. After controlling random effects, the results shown in Column 4 indicate that physicians in clinics were most likely to prescribe generic drugs, and this probability decreased with hospital accreditation levels. Specifically, compared with physicians in clinics, physicians in local community hospitals (H 3 ) were nearly 5% less likely to prescribe generic drugs, and physicians in metropolitan hospitals (H 2 ) and academic medical centers (H 1 ) were 10% and 16% less likely to prescribe generic drugs, respectively. These estimates indicate that the physicians' preference for generic drugs decreases as the size of their hospital and clinic decreases, and increases with the physicians' responsiveness to the profits earned from their medications. The estimates of H varied in sign and statistical significance conditional on whether random effects were controlled, which indicates the bias in estimation presents when physicians' heterogeneity is not controlled. Although the estimates of the interaction terms between hospital ownership and hospital accreditation level were statistically insignificant, it is likely that the number of clinic owners is much larger than the number of hospital owners. Similarly, physicians who worked in private hospitals were more likely to prescribe generic drugs than physicians in public hospitals. Because public hospitals are nonprofit institutions, the estimate provides further evidence that physicians who are more responsive to profits earned from their prescriptions prescribed more generic drugs.
The results reported in Table 2 show that physicians in hospitals and clinics behaved differently regarding their drug prescriptions. Tables 3 and 4 present the estimation results by using the prescriptions of physicians from clinics and hospitals, respectively. Table 3 shows that physicians in clinics prescribed fewer brand-name drugs as the price difference increased, but were insensitive to payers' cost sharing percentage. As discussed in Section 2, these estimates did not reject the hypothesis that γ 3 -γ 1 =0, indicating that physicians in clinics were insensitive to who pays for the drug. Therefore, the moral hazard problem was not observed among the physicians in clinics. In addition, Table 3 shows that clinic owners prescribed more generic drugs than employed physicians in clinics, and more competition in the market reduced the probability that clinic owners prescribe generic drugs. The interaction terms between clinical ownership and the number of competitors also indicate that clinic owners prescribed fewer generic drugs as the number of drug providers increased. In addition, physicians in public clinics prescribed fewer generic drugs than their counterparts in private clinics did. Although these estimates are statistically significant and similar to the results shown in Table 2 , their magnitudes are relatively smaller than those obtained using the entire sample.
Table 3 also indicates that older and more experienced physicians in clinics prescribed fewer generic drugs, which differs from the results observed when using the entire sample. Because most physicians in clinics work alone, it is likely that their access to new information on generic drugs is limited. Along with the estimates shown in Table 2 , the results from using clinical sample indicate that a physician's cost of accessing new information on drugs depends on their age and experience, as well as their work place. Besides, although some of the individual correlated random effects were statistically insignificant, joint test suggested that the effect is statistically significant (χ 2 =8.57).
The results indicate that the unobserved individual heterogeneity among clinical physicians is a crucial determinant ofphysician their prescription decisions. Table 4 shows the results observed when using the prescriptions of physicians in hospitals. The estimates were similar before and after controlling random effects, and the random effects were statistically significant at an aggregate level (χ 2 =13.98). Although physicians' choice of drugs in hospitals might be limited because of the collective decisions made by executive committees, the results indicate that their prescription decisions were still affected by their individual heterogeneity. It is also likely that the importance of this effect decreases as the size of the physicians' affiliated hospitals increases, because this individual heterogeneity was statistically insignificant (χ 2 =0.45) using only physicians at academic medical centers (H 1 ).
20 Table 4 shows that physicians in hospitals prescribed 12% more generic drugs as the price difference increased by NT$1, indicating that they had internalized patients' utility. However, as shown in Column 2, this effect was reduced by 2% of the payer's cost share. Although this effect became statistically insignificant after controlling random effects (p-value=0.118), these estimates indicate that physicians in hospitals were more sensitive to who pays the costs than physicians in clinics. Liu et al. (2009) argued that large hospitals have high incentives to purchase brandname drugs because of their better quality. The estimates support this argument by showing that physicians in hospitals place higher weight on patients' utility (γ 1 ) than their weight on the payers' cost (γ 3 ). The results also indicate that the physician's moral hazard problem observed when using entire sample was mostly obtained from physicians in hospitals.
Similar to the previous results, hospitals owners prescribed more generic drugs than the other physicians, and this effect decreased as the number of competitors in the market increased. Adding one additional competitor to the market also reduced the probability of an average physician's generic prescriptions by approximately 11%. For the same estimate of the number of competitors (F ) in Table 3 , this effect was greater for physicians in hospitals than for physicians in clinics. Therefore, the estimate of F in Table 2 was influenced mainly by physicians in hospitals. Because than other physicians in clinics. 20 The results observed when using only physicians in academic medical centers are similar to the results shown in Table 4 and are not reported in this paper, but are available upon request.
the executive committees in large hospitals decide the composition of the drug formulary, this study shows that their decisions were strongly affected by market competition.
21 Moreover, physicians in local community hospitals (H 3 ) were 8% and 18% more likely to prescribe generic drugs than physicians in metropolitan and academic medical centers, respectively. Similar to the estimates of hospital accreditation level in Table 2 , Table 4 shows that physicians in small hospitals are more responsive to profits earned by their medications than physicians in large hospitals. Physicians in large hospitals also considered drug quality more than their counterparts in small hospitals. Furthermore, physicians in private hospitals were more likely to prescribe generic drugs than physicians in public hospitals. Experienced and older physicians, physicians with older patients, and physicians in long-established hospitals were also more likely to prescribe generic drugs.
Conclusion
Because physicians' choice between brand-name and generic prescriptions involves the interests of patients, payers, and the physician herself, studying the determinants of physicians' generic pharmaceutical adoptions is complex. This study empirically examined this physicians' double agency problem by using data from Taiwan because of the two institutional features: The universal health care system caused the moral hazard problem between the payer and physicians to become a public concern; and strong financial incentives provided to physicians in Taiwan because of their capability to both prescribe and dispense drugs. The considerably high pharmaceutical expenditures and few generic adoptions in Taiwan further increase the relevance of this double agency problem. This paper differs from the previous literature because this is the first study to address the physician's double agency problem by using an integrated empirical framework. This is also the first study to structure the Taiwanese NHIRD data by using a panel framework in which visit-physiciandrug is structured as a unit of observation. Each physician is treated as a group, and the number of his medication orders is treated as the time dimension. The repeated observations of a physician's prescription behavior enable the empirical estimation to control the physician's unobserved, timeinvariant heterogeneity by using a correlated random effect method. The characteristics of the physicians, patients, and hospitals, as well as fixed effects, including time, location, and drugs, are also controlled in the regression.
The empirical results show that a larger price difference between brand-name and generic drugs increased the number of physicians' generic prescriptions, indicating that physicians internalized patients' utility. However, for physicians in large hospitals, this effect decreased as the payer's cost share percentage increased. The results show that the moral hazard problem between physicians and the payer is more severe in large hospitals than in clinics, because physicians in large hospitals considered drug quality more than physicians in clinics did. Large hospitals also had greater power in negotiating the price of brand-name drugs than small hospitals did.
Regarding the effect of the financial incentives of physicians on their adoption of generic pharmaceuticals, this study shows that physicians who were more responsive to the profit earned from their prescriptions prescribed more generic drugs than the other physicians. In particular, this study shows that: (1) Owners of hospitals and clinics prescribe more generic drugs than the other employed physicians; (2) Physicians in clinics are most likely ones to prescribe generic drugs, and this likelihood decreases as the size of the physicians' affiliated hospital size increases; (3) Physicians in private hospitals are more likely to prescribe generic drugs than doctors in public hospitals. Consequently, this study indicates that the financial incentives of physicians are an important determinant of their decisions regarding generic prescriptions. The generic drugs providers are likely to provide these incentives, because the empirical results also show that the probability of physicians prescribing generic drugs decreases with the number of competitors in the same ingredient market, and this effect is particularly strong for hospital and clinic owners, as well as physicians in large hospitals. Besides, the empirical results show that controlling physicians' unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity is crucial when studying physicians' prescription behaviors, especially physicians in clinics or small hospitals.
The reported findings suggest that physicians' double agent role in a universal health care system is responsible for part of the pharmaceutical expenditure in Taiwan. Specifically, brand-name drugs were probably prescribed more than necessary, especially when physicians' incentives for prescribing generic drugs were absent. Because physicians responded to financial incentives as shown in this study, the Taiwanese government can encourage generic prescriptions by providing some incentives for physicians to prescribe generic drugs when necessary. Another method to increase generic prescriptions is to increase the patients' share of their medication cost. Because physicians internalized the patients' utility as shown in this paper, a greater copayment would reduce both the patients' and physicians' demand for brand-name drugs. In addition, increasing patients' and physicians' access to the information on generic drugs is another policy tool for reducing their prescription of brand-name drugs.
22 Although this study also shows that physicians who are responsive to profits prescribed more generic drugs, the rents generated from their prescriptions that shared between hospitals, physicians, and pharmaceutical companies probably created extra burden on the pharmaceutical expenditure in Taiwan. Therefore, future research conducted using detailed data on the size of these rents is required for advanced study on the double agent role of physicians in a universal health care system. in the data on ambulatory care orders (OO). As indicated in Section 3, a patient can receive multiple treatments in each visit. Six variables in the CD and OO files were applied as identifiers to merge the two data sets: FEE YM, APPL TYPE, HOSP ID, APPL DATE, CASE TYPE, and SEQ NO. The OO data indicates which data were used in each visit, linking the CD and DRUG data sets. This information is also summarized in Appendix Table 1 .
Appendix 
A2 Drug Information
The DRUG registry in the NHIRD provides necessary information on the drugs used in this study. In particular, the ingredient of a drug (DRCON NAME) and the identification code of this ingredient (DRUG ITEM) were used to identify the OHAs prescribed in the sample. The identification code of a drug (DRUG ID) was used to identify its version (brand name or generic), whereas the name of the provider of a drug (DRGIST NAME) was used to calculate the number of competitors in the market for a given ingredient. In addition, the price (DRUG PRICE) and quantity (DRCON QTY) of a drug were used to calculate the drug price per defined daily doses (DDD) according to the definition from the WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics (WHOCC, http://www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_index). This information is also summarized in Appendix Table  1 , and the DDD and unit of each drug obtained from the WHOCC is summarized in Appendix Table 2 . As described in Footnote 16 in the main text, information on DDD was crucial in this study because drug price was defined as the price required for the DDD of a drug, which enables the price among various drugs to be compared.
Appendix Table 2 lists the recorded information on the available OHAs in the DRUG registry during the sample period, including the number of providers and number prescribed according to drug and year. Five categories of OHAs with twelve different ingredients are recorded in the DRUG registry, and their ATC codes were obtained from the WHOCC. Because the NHIRD does not provide the information on whether the drug prescribed is a generic or brand-name drug, this study used the drug identifier (DRUG ID) in the DRUG registry to link with the drug query system maintained by the National Health Insurance Administration (NHIA) for this information (http://www.nhi.gov.tw/Query/query1.aspx?menu=18&menu_id=703, in Chinese). In addition, the name of a drug provider (DRGIST NAME) in the DRUG registry was applied to calculate the number of firms that provide drugs with the same ingredient in the market. Some of the provider information was missing in the 2003 and 2007 DRUG registry, and was recovered using the same NHIA website.
As shown in Appendix Table 2 , drugs with certain ingredients were widely prescribed in Taiwan, and the prescriptions varied between the brand-name and generic versions. For example, drugs with metformin were prescribed 5,602 times in the data, and 66% of these drugs were generic. These drugs were prescribed frequently because they are often used as the drug for patients with diabetes in the early stage. By contrast, we excluded drugs with ingredients without generic alternatives, or for which the generic version was not prescribed in a given year. For example, glimepiride and acarbose were not included in the 2003 sample because no generic version was available during that year. Although the generic versions of repaglinide and nateglinide were available in the 2004 sample, they were not included in that year because no generic prescription was recorded in the sample. Consequently, glimepiride and acarbose were not 
